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Campaign finance systems that provide benefits to candidates who voluntarily
limit their campaign spending increasingly include mechanisms that give these candi-
dates additional funds (or the opportunity to raise additional funds) in the event that
their opponents benefit from private campaign expenditures.' These mechanisms are
called "triggers." Triggers may be designed in several manners, based upon the type of
political event that engages a trigger and the type of financial benefit a trigger affords.
Reformers assert that triggers are essential to genuine campaign finance reform.
Without triggers, the argument goes, candidates will not accept voluntary spending
limits in exchange for financial benefits. No candidate will unilaterally disarm, reform-
ers argue, when faced with potentially unlimited expenditures by opposing candidates
or their allies. Opponents of triggers argue that these mechanisms are unconstitutional
because they chill speech---either by punishing independent spenders or candidates
who do not accept voluntary spending limits for engaging in First Amendment activi-
ties, or by coercing candidates into accepting spending limits.
This article argues that triggers are constitutional. Section I reviews the legal
and policy reasons reformers are designing and seeking passage of campaign finance
systems that include triggers. Section III presents the spectrum of possible trigger
designs. Section IV reviews the jurisprudence of triggers. Section V argues that trig-
gers are constitutional because they inflict no cognizable First Amendment injuries.
* Staff Attorney, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. I thank all
of my colleagues at the Brennan Center for spending many hours with me sharing their opinions on
the topic of this article. The lucid comments of Professor Burt Neuborne and Josh Rosenkranz were
particularly helpful in framing the relevant issues. I owe the greatest debt to Glenn Moramarco for
guiding me through each phase of the writing of this article, and patiently reading and editing many
drafts.
1. In November 1996, voters in Maine enacted a campaign finance system that will go into
effect in 2000 that includes trigger provisions. An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1995 Me. Laws
384, § 1125(9) (draft on file with author). Triggers are included in drafts of initiatives that reformers
plan to submit to voters in 1998 in Arizona, Massachusetts, and New York City. Citizens Clean Elec-
tion Act § 16-952 (Arizona initiative) (draft on file with author); The Massachusetts Clean Elections
Law § 11 (draft on file with author); this author is currently co-drafting a bill and a referendum for
New York City's Clean Money Elections Coalition that also includes triggers. In each of the nation's
remaining states, Public Campaign (a national organization providing technical support to state and
local organizations working on campaign finance reform) is using a model bill that includes trigger
provisions as a tool to organize future ballot and legislative initiatives. Public Campaign, ANNOTATED
MODEL LEGISLATION FOR CLEAN MONEY CAMPAIGN REFORM, 27, 39 (Dec. 1997) (on file with au-
thor). Triggers also appear in the House and Senate bills that would provide full public financing for
all federal elections. H.R. 2199, 105th Cong. § 506(d) (1997); S. 918, 105th Cong. § 506(d) (1997).
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II. THE LEGAL AND POLICY REASONS REFORMERS ARE
DESIGNING AND SEEKING PASSAGE OF TRIGGERS
Triggers are complex mechanisms that are designed to achieve an objective that
is relatively straightforward: leveling the financial playing field among candidates.
Explaining why reformers rely on an obtuse device to achieve a relatively simple goal
requires review of campaign finance jurisprudence and campaign spending patterns.
A. How Buckley Made Voluntary Spending Limits the Only Equalization
Device Available to Reformers
The most simple way to level the financial playing field among candidates is to
impose a mandatory campaign spending cap A ore difficult way to achieve this goal
is to give financial benefits to candidates who voluntarily limit their spending. The
Supreme Court-in its landmark decision on campaign finance, Buckley v. Valeo 2-
struck the former method and upheld the latter.
Buckley arrived at the Court in the following manner. In 1974, Congress enacted
the 1974 Amendments3 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).' This
legislation had four major components: (1) caps on campaign contributions; (2) limits
on campaign spending; (3) campaign finance reporting and disclosure requirements;
and (4) public funding allowances for presidential candidates who voluntarily limit
their campaign spending.'
Buckley considered the constitutionality of FECA and, except for the spending
limits, the Court upheld its provisions. Reasoning that money equals speech, the Buck-
ley Court rejected the government's argument that campaign finance rules deserve less
demanding First Amendment scrutiny.6 Instead, the Buckley Court examined the First
Amendment values at stake in every activity regulated by FECA, and then balanced
each value against the two compelling interests that were offered to justify burdening
the First Amendment, deterring corruption and equalizing political participation.
Beginning with contribution limits, the Court concluded that giving money to
candidates was not a direct act of expression, and thus was not worthy of the highest
level of First Amendment protection. Applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, the
Court found that the government's interest in deterring the corruptive potential of this
act was legitimate.7
Spending campaign money, on the other hand, was found to be an act of pure
expression entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection. The Buckley
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curium).
3. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 & 47 U.S.C.).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441h, 451-455 and scattered sections of 18 & 47 U.S.C.). The background infor-
mation in this article on FECA and Buckley draws heavily from the following two Brennan Center
publications, mostly the former. BuIRT NEUBORNE, CAMAIGN FINANCE REFORMs & THE CoNSTrIrrON:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT BUcKLEY V. VALEO (Brennan Center for Justice Campaign Finance Reform Series
1997); KENNETH WEINE, THE FLow OF MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECrONS (Brennan Center for
Justice Campaign Finance Reform Series 1997).
5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Id. at 23-38.
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Court rejected the government's arguments that spending limits deterred corruption,
and that spending limits helped equalize elections.' According to the Court, spending
limits cannot deter corruption because a corrupt act requires a quid pro quo arrange-
ment between two people. The Court observed that when a candidate spends money
(unlike when he solicits a contribution) there is no deal being made that can potentially
corrupt the candidate.9
Equalization was also rejected as a justification for spending limits because the
Court could not accept limiting strong voices in an effort to aid weak voices. "The
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment." 
0
Public financing for presidential candidates, FECA's other means of leveling the
financial playing field among candidates, was upheld by the Buckley Court."
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition
acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified
expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the
contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and
accept public funding. 2
Public financing, according to the Court, serves two governmental interests: "eliminat-
ing the improper influence of large private contributions," and "relieving [candidates]
from the rigors of soliciting private contributions."' 3 The Buckley Court also observed
that public financing enhances the First Amendment. "[Public funding provisions are] a
congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict or censor speech, but rather to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral
process ....
By striking mandatory spending limits but upholding public financing, the Buck-
ley Court struck FECA's stick (spending limits) but embraced its carrot (public financ-
ing). Thus, as mentioned above, reformers were left with only one means of leveling
the financial playing field among candidates-public financing.
Reformers responded to Buckley by creating several types of carrots. Through
legislative and citizen initiatives, at the state and local levels, reformers designed and
implemented campaign systems that give candidates a variety of financial benefits if
they voluntarily limit their spending.' 5 The types of benefits that candidates are of-
fered include (1) an amount of public funding equal to what is thought to be necessary
8. Id. at 39-59.
9. Id. at 55-56.
10. Id. at 48-49.
11. The plaintiffs in Buckley challenged the public finance provisions on the theory that third
party candidates were discriminated against. Id. at 90. It was not argued that candidates are coerced
into accepting spending limits and therefore deprived of their First Amendment rights. This argument
was put forth and rejected in Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 487 F.
Supp. 280, 283-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
12. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
13. Id. at 96.
14. Id. at 92-93.
15. The following states provide some form of direct public financing to specified candidates:
Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine (beginning in 2000), Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. OFFICE OF ELECTION ADMIN.,
FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, CAMPAIGN FINANcE LAw 96 chart 4 (1996).
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to run a competitive campaign; 6 (2) publicly funded matching grants for each private
contribution raised; 7 and/or (3) the ability to raise contributions in larger increments
than candidates who do not voluntarily limit their spending. 8
These systems, however, are the exception and not the rule. The campaign fi-
nance systems of most states and localities are similar to the system that FECA created
for congressional candidates: contributions to candidates are limited, spending by can-
didates is unlimited, and there is no public financing.
B. How Campaign Spending Patterns in the Post-Buckley Era Created the
Rise of Triggers
By striking FECA's spending ceilings, while upholding its reporting and disclo-
sure requirements, contribution limits, and public funding provisions,
the Buckley Court created a campaign finance system very different from the one
Congress intended.... Contribution limits and disclosure requirements made rais-
ing money harder, but the lack of spending caps maintained the system's voracious
need for money. In simple economic terms, the Buckley Court limited supply (con-
tributions), while leaving demand (expenditures) free to grow without limit....
Inadvertently, the Buckley opinion took a congressional program designed to mini-
mize the impact of wealth on campaigns and turned it into an engine for the glo-
rification of money. 9
As discussed above, for reformers interested in equalizing participation in the electoral
process among candidates, regardless of wealth, the Buckley decision made voluntary
spending limits the only means to achieve this end. Unlike campaign systems with
mandatory spending limits-where candidates have no choice as to whether or not to
limit their spending-systems with voluntary limits will only have a significant
equalizing impact if most candidates accept these limits. Accordingly, reformers have
sought to identify and accommodate concerns of candidates that might deter them from
accepting voluntary spending limits.
Triggers are used to accommodate a leading concern of candidates. According to
reformers, many candidates would decline voluntary limits because they are afraid of
not having the financial resources to respond to independent spenders or opponents
who do not voluntarily limit their spending.2 A candidate leery of accepting a volun-
tary limit invokes the unilateral disarmament metaphor mentioned in the introduction.
"It would be foolhardy for me to limit my spending," he argues, "if I may face unlim-
ited spending from an opponent or his allies." The two types of expenditures most
16. For example, the Democratic and Republican nominees for governor in New Jersey received
$5.9 million each for the 1994 general election. Id. at NJ-13.
17. For example, candidates for New York City offices may receive matching public grants for all
contributions of $1000 or less from city residents. N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE § 3-705 (NEw
YORK CITY -CHARTER 1996).
18. For example, candidates in Rhode Island that accept voluntary spending limits may raise funds
in $2000 increments, -compared to $1000 increments for nonparticipating candidates. R.I. GN. LAws
§ 17-25-30 (1996).
19. NEUBORNE, supra note 4, at 12.
20. In each of the cases reviewing the constitutionality of triggers (discussed infra Part V) it was
argued that triggers are necessary to induce candidates to accept voluntary spending limits. See
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1551 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997);
Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 927
(W.D. Ky. 1995).
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feared are (1) spending by self-funded candidates (e.g., Ross Perot), and (2) indepen-
dent spending (i.e., expenditures from unions, corporations, political parties, or political
organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, the local Chamber of Commerce)).
There is ample reason for these fears. The financial power of self-funded candi-
dates and independent spenders has grown significantly in the post-Buckley era. As to
the former, while candidates without a large personal fortune must undertake the labor-
intensive task of gathering donations in small increments from a large number of peo-
ple, millionaire candidates can raise their money by writing one check to their cam-
paigns. Wealthy candidates could fund their own campaigns before Buckley, but in that
era some candidates were able to counter this spending by raising contributions of the
same size from wealthy allies.
Likewise, independent spenders have increased financial power in the post-
Buckley era. Since 1974 candidates have not been able to raise more than $1000 per
election from each individual contributor. Meanwhile, increases in the cost of living
and campaign expenditures have made campaign costs sextuple.2 For candidates, this
means spending a larger sum of money each political cycle, but having to raise this
sum in increments of decreasing value. Independent spenders, however, have not faced
the same burden. Through liberal use of election law loopholes, political organizations,
unions, corporations and political parties have been able to raise and spend funds in
unlimited amounts so long as they do not explicitly coordinate their activities with
candidates.
This independent spending has given candidates a new potential opponent. No
longer is spending by other candidates the only concern. In the post-Buckley era, the
allies of an opponent pose a formidable-and is some instances, a greater-spending
threat. For example, in Arizona in 1996, the AFL-CIO spent almost $2 million attack-
ing a Republican House incumbentY Similarly, in a special House election in New
York City in 1997, the Republican National Committee spent $800,000 "independent-
ly" attacking the Democratic nominee.23 All told, in 1996 over two dozen oiganiza-
tions spent over $150 million in advertising-compared to just over $400 million spent
by federal candidates on advertising costs.24
Triggers address these types of expenditures by giving financial benefits to can-
didates who accept voluntary spending limits. In essence, triggers function as insurance
policies. Triggers insure that candidates who accept voluntary spending limits will be
able to respond to the types of expenditures they most fear.
III. THE SPECTRUM OF TRIGGERS
Reformers have been as creative in designing varieties of triggers as they have
been in designing public finance systems for candidates that voluntarily limit their
spending.
In general, there are two scenarios for which triggers may be designed and three
types of responses that can be provided for these two scenarios. The two scenarios are:
21. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CAMPAIGN FINANCING 2 (1996).
22. 1996 House Post-Mortem, COOK POL. REP., Dec. 11, 1996, at 55.
23. Republican Prestidigitation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at A30.
24. DEBORAH BECK Er AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN: A




(1) spending by a candidate who does not accept voluntary spending limits (an "opt-
out candidate," as compared to an "opt-in candidate") and (2) independent spending.'
The three general types of responses that triggers may provide are: (1) allowing opt-in
candidates to spend additional funds and to raise these funds privately; (2) allowing
opt-in candidates to spend additional funds and to raise these funds privately with the
help of government matching funds for each contribution raised; and (3) providing
candidates with government funds outright.
Designing a trigger demands more than simply defining the type of political
scenario to which the trigger will respond and the type of response it will afford. Many
details must be addressed. For example, a trigger could go into effect when an opt-out
candidate or independent spender spends one dollar or $1 million. A trigger providing
matching public funds may match contributions at a one-to-one ratio, a three-to-one
ratio, or at any other re--crinable !eve1 ! A tri gger giving candidate-s public funds outright
could provide these funds in the form of cash or in-kind donations (e.g., vouchers for
free broadcast advertisements).
These decisions on details may have enormous policy implications. For example,
there are consequences to deciding what constitutes independent spending. If indepen-
dent spending includes only express advocacy (i.e., communications that advocate the
election or defeat of an identified candidate) and not issue advocacy (i.e., generic
communications concerning political issues) intense pressure will be placed on the line
between these two types of speech. Political participants seeking to avoid giving fi-
nancial benefits to opt-in candidates will spend money on speech that comes close to,
but stops short of, expressly supporting a candidate.
The chart below summarizes the two scenarios and the three means of response
involving the triggers reviewed above:
Political Scenario Means of Response
1. opt-in candidate challenged a. release opt-in candidate from spending
by opt-out candidate limit and allow him to raise and spend addi-
tional private funds
2. independent spending that
benefits opponent of opt-in b. release opt-in candidate from spending
candidate limit and allow him to raise and spend
additional private funds, and match the contri-
butions raised with public money
c. release opt-in candidate from spending limit
and provide public funds to opt-in candidate
25. For the purposes of this article, the term independent spender denotes an individual, union,
corporation, organization or political party engaged in express advocacy (e.g., speech that advocates the
election or defeat of an identified candidate) or issue advocacy (e.g., generic political speech concern-
ing issues rather than particular candidates).
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IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TRIGGERS
Opponents of triggers argue these mechanisms are unconstitutional because they
chill First Amendment activity. The arguments of trigger opponents have been heard in
three federal cases: one involving a trigger engaged by independent expenditures (Day
v. Holahan26), and two involving triggers engaged by the spending of opt-out candi-
dates (Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez2 and Wilkinson v. Jones").
A. Day v. Holahan
Day v. Holahan reviewed a 1993 legislative amendment to Minnesota's Ethics
and Campaign Act that included a trigger provision.29 This trigger provided that the
voluntary spending limit of a candidate against whom an independent expenditure is
made is "increased by the sum of independent expenditures made in opposition to
[such] a candidate plus independent expenditures made on behalf of the candidate's
major political party opponents."' It also provided that "[w]ithin three days after pro-
viding [notice], the [state ethical practices] board shall pay each candidate against
whom the independent expenditures have been made ... an additional public subsidy
equal to one-half the independent expenditures."'" Thus, if an opt-in candidate was at-
tacked by an independent expenditure or his opponent benefitted from one, the trigger
raised the opt-in candidate's voluntary spending limit by the amount of the independent
expenditure and gave the opt-in candidate a public subsidy equal to one-half the inde-
pendent expenditure.
Plaintiffs challenging this trigger's constitutionality included independent spend-
ers and a candidate. Their principal argument was that the statute caused "self-censor-
ship., 32 "By granting a public subsidy to opposed candidates, and by increasing their
expenditure limits, [the statute has the effect] of deterring [an independent spender]
from making independent expenditures."33 Two Supreme Court cases were offered as
legal support, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,34 and Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.31 In both of these cases the Court struck regu-
lations requiring speakers to deliver their opponents' message. Tornillo struck a regula-
tion requiring a newspaper to give response space to a candidate whose opponent bene-
fitted from an editorial.36 Pacific Gas struck a regulation requiring a public utility to
include in its bills to consumers an insertion from a consumer organization. 37 The
Court ruled that the effect of these types of regulations "was to deter [speakers] from
speaking out in the first instance."3 Plaintiffs in Day argued that the trigger created a
26. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
27. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1551 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820
(1977).
28. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 927 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
29. Day, 34 F.3d at 1356.
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.25, subd. 13(a) (West 1997).
31. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.25, subd. 13(c) (West 1997).
32. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360.
33. Brief for Appellant at 6, Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 94-2387, 94-
2388, 94-2390 & "94-2587) (on file with author).
34. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
35. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
36. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 245.
37. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 6.
38. Id. at 10.
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situation in which their spending gave financial benefits to their opponents and there-
fore they suffered the same First Amendment burdens as the plaintiffs in Miami Her-
aid and Pacific Gas.
The government responded that the trigger imposed no First Amendment bur-
dens, and that it was a necessary device to encourage candidate participation in the
public funding system. "The statute does not penalize [the plaintiffs] or restrict them
from making whatever independent expenditures they deem necessary or desirable, nor
do the statutes force them to expend funds to facilitate the expression of views which
they oppose."39 Alternatively, the government argued that even if the court concluded
that the trigger imposed a cognizable First Amendment injury, this burden was consti-
tutional. Minnesota's trigger, it was argued, provided a sufficiently narrowly tailored
means to achieve a compelling state interest. "The acceptance of public subsidies re-
duces candidates' need to solicit contributions, thus reducing the deleterious influence
of large contributions on the political process and giving candidates more time to meet
voters and publicly debate the issues."'
The district court completely adopted the government's arguments. No cogniza-
ble First Amendment injury exists, the court reasoned, from helping "an opponent to
respond using public funds, additional private funds, or both."4 The court dismissed
the plaintiffs' invocations of Miami Herald and Pacific Gas, pointing out the statutes
reviewed in these cases "'forced the speaker's opponent-not the taxpaying public-to
assist in disseminating the speaker's message."' 42 Finally, the court stated that the
trigger enhances, not burdens, the First Amendment. "To the extent the statute provides
for increased debate about issues of public concern raised by an independent expendi-
ture, it promotes the free and open debate the First Amendment seeks to foster and
protect."43
The Eighth Circuit rejected each component of the district court's opinion. It
began by stating that the trigger inflicted a cognizable First Amendment injury. It
reached this conclusion by noting first that independent expenditures are protected
speech, to which "' [t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection." '" The
court then reasoned that "[t]he knowledge that a candidate who [an independent spend-
er] does not want to be elected will have her spending limits increased and will receive
a public subsidy equal to half the amount of the independent expenditure, as a direct
result of that independent expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected
speech."'45
Deciding that Minnesota's trigger was content-based and therefore deserved the
strictest constitutional scrutiny, the court rejected the government's argument that the
trigger's First Amendment burdens were justified by the compelling interest of encour-
aging acceptance of voluntary spending limits. "[W]ith candidate participation in public
campaign financing nearing 100% before enactment of [the trigger], the interest, no
39. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 10, Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Nos. 94-2387, 94-2388, 94-2390 & 94-2587) (on file with author).
40. Id. at 11.
41. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994).
42. Id. at 946 (quoting Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15).
43. Day, 863 F. Supp. at 947.
44. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
45. Day, 34 F.3d at 1360.
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matter how compelling in the abstract, is not legitimate." 4 The court then proceeded
to conclude that the trigger would not satisfy "strict, intermediate, or even the most
cursory scrutiny."'47
B. Wilkinson v. Jones and Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez
Using rationales similar to those offered by the legislature in Day, the Minnesota
and Kentucky legislatures adopted triggers that give fiancial benefits to opt-in candi-
dates facing opt-out candidates spending over specified amounts. These triggers were
both upheld.
Minnesota's trigger was reviewed in Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez. In Minnesota, an
opt-in candidate is released from his spending limit if an opt-out candidate receives
contributions or makes expenditures equaling twenty percent of the applicable limit
prior to ten days before the primary election, and contributions or expenditures equal-
ing fifty percent of the applicable limit thereafter. The opt-in candidate may then raise
public funds for his additional spending.' Wilkinson v. Jones reviewed a trigger for
Kentucky that releases an opt-in candidate from his voluntary spending limit if an opt-
out candidate spends over this limit.'9 The trigger also provides matching public funds
for the contributions raised for the additional spending."
Plaintiffs in both cases argued that the respective triggers unconstitutionally
burden their First Amendment rights. But the argument these plaintiffs put forth dif-
fered from that of the plaintiffs in Day. Instead of arguing that the trigger punished
them for speaking, the plaintiffs in Rosenstiel and Wilkinson claimed that the respec-
tive triggers coerced candidates into accepting spending limits. Specifically, the Rosen-
stiel plaintiffs contended that by releasing candidates from their spending limits and
conferring financial benefits upon these candidates, the Minnesota trigger made the
voluntary system so attractive that candidates are effectively compelled to limit their
spending.5' The Wilkinson plaintiffs made this same argument, claiming that with
Kentucky's trigger no opt-out candidate would exceed the voluntary spending cap
because doing so would provide additional funds to his opponent, allowing the opt-in
candidate to respond to the opt-out candidate. 2
This argument was rejected by both courts. The Rosenstiel court meticulously
debunked the claim that the incentives Minnesota's trigger provided unduly coerced
opt-out candidates to limit their spending. The court relied upon Vote Choice, Inc. v.
DiStefano53 which upheld provisions allowing candidates accepting voluntary spend-
ing limits to collect funds in larger increments than opt-out candidates. Vote Choice,
according to Rosenstiel, stands for the principle that it does not burden the First
Amendment for governments to offer plans that provide "a relative balance between
advantages afforded to, and restrictions placed on, publicly financed candidates."'"
46. Id. at 1361.
47. Id. at 1362.
48. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1546-48 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1820 (1997).
49. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
50. Id. at 926.
51. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549.
52. Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 927.
53. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (lst Cir. 1993).
54. Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1550-51.
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Minnesota's trigger, reasoned the Rosenstiel court, accomplishes this balancing act.
"The expenditure waiver.., is simply an attempt by the State to avert a powerful
disincentive for participation in its public financing scheme: namely a concern of being
grossly outspent by a privately financed opponent with no expenditure limit."" By
averting this incentive through a trigger that funds additional speech, the court con-
cluded, "the State's scheme promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First
Amendment values. 56
The Wilkinson court did not expressly decide whether Kentucky's trigger chills
speech by coercing candidates into accepting spending limits. Instead, the court argued
that even if the trigger was found to chill speech, the First Amendment burden was "a
narrowly tailored means which addresses a compelling state interest.
'57 The interest
the court found compelling was identical to that which the Eighth Circuit in Day re-
jected-inducing candidates to accept spending limits. "Kentucky has a compelling
interest in encouraging candidates to accept public financing and its accompanying
limitations which are designed to promote greater political dialogue among the can-
didates and combat corruption by reducing candidates' reliance on fundraising ef-
forts."5" The court argued that not having a trigger "may discourage candidates from
accepting public financing in the face of expenditure-unlimited privately-financed
opponents.""
V. TRIGGERS DO NOT INFLICT COGNIZABLE
FIRST AMENDMENT INJURIES
Day, Rosenstiel, and Wilkinson relied on different reasoning and reach competing
conclusions. Reviewing Minnesota's trigger for independent expenditures the district
court in Day concluded this mechanism did not inflict a cognizable injury. The Eighth
Circuit disagreed. In Rosenstiel, a separate panel from the Eighth Circuit ruled that a
Minnesota trigger for opt-out candidate expenditures does not inflict a cognizable inju-
ry. The Wilkinson court highly doubted that an opt-out candidate trigger imposed a
cognizable First Amendment injury, and reasoned that even if it did, the trigger was
acceptable because is was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.
This case law gives little comfort to reformers advocating adoption of campaign
finance systems that include triggers. There is little common ground in these cases
regarding what should be the central question; whether the trigger being reviewed
inflicts a cognizable First Amendment injury. The answer to this question, in all of
these cases, should have been a clear, unequivocal no. To reach this result and uphold
the constitutionality of triggers reformers must articulate clearly the following two
arguments: (1) permitting and encouraging a response to speech is not "chilling" and
(2) constitutionally, campaign finance systems that include triggers deserve identical
treatment as the public funding system upheld in Buckley.
55. Id. at 1551.
56. Id. at 1552 (citations omitted). The court proceeded to conclude that even if the trigger was
assumed to burden the First Amendment it would survive strict scrutiny.
57. Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id.
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A. Permitting and Encouraging a Response to Speech Is Not "Chilling"
According to the Eighth Circuit decision in Day, "the knowledge that a candidate
who one does not want to be elected will [receive financial benefits] ... chills the free
exercise of that protected speech."' ° This conclusion contradicts First Amendment
jurisprudence and runs counter to the purpose of the First Amendment. A candidate's
First Amendment rights cannot be chilled by the "knowledge" that an opponent will be
able to respond to his speech. The First Amendment is concerned with persecution, not
reprisal. That is, it protects individuals from being persecuted--or chilled-from spea-
king. Its purpose is not to inhibit individuals from responding to speech. Otherwise, the
First Amendment would be used not to foster the type of vibrant exchange of ideas
necessary for democracy to flourish, but instead would serve to give one or more
speakers hegemony of the market of speech.
There is a bright line between the government regulating speech and the govern-
ment speaking. While the First Amendment forbids governments from silencing or
coercing speech, it nevertheless allows governments to speak freely. In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette" the Court struck a provision requiring school-
aged children to join in a flag salute ceremony. The Court reasoned that forcing the
expression of a view is as offensive as forbidding the expression of a view.6" Like-
wise, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education63 the Court struck a law forcing public
employees who were not members of a union to pay a fee equal to the dues of union
members. In both of these cases the Court struck governmental efforts to regulate
speech.
Yet governments are free to speak. Each year the federal government is one of
the ten largest advertisers in the nation." It spends over $500 million per year on
hundreds of films, slide shows, television programs and radio broadcasts.65 This spen-
ding is constitutional because it does not cause an actual interference with any person's
First Amendment rights.
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit decision in Day, each court reviewing a
trigger concluded that the trigger did not cause a cognizable First Amendment injury
because the government was not actually inhibiting speech. According to the Day court
the First Amendment claim failed because the "[p]laintiffs are free to make as many
independent expenditures as they desire without restraint, censure or penalty by the
Government."' The Rosenstiel court stated, "[t]hese inducements [for candidates to
limit their spending], however, do not per se render the State's scheme coercive be-
cause they are not inherently penal."67 Finally, before the Wilkinson court was willing
to grant, for the sake of argument, that Kentucky's trigger causes an injury, it stated
"[tihis court is not convinced that [the provision] impermissibly chills the speech of
60. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994).
61. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
62. LAWRENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 804 (2d ed. 1988).
63. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
64. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 807 n.12 (citing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 7
(1983)).
65. Id.
66. Day v. Hayes, 863 F. Supp. 940, 947 (D. Minn. 1994).




privately-financed candidates simply because it enables the speakers' adversaries to
respond."
The purpose of the First Amendment runs counter to the goals of opponents of
triggers. According to the Supreme Court, "the central purpose of the Speech and Press
Clauses was to assure a society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' public
debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a society
can a healthy representative democracy flourish." The goal of opponents of triggers
is exactly the opposite. By seeking to deter opt-in candidates from responding to ex-
penditures by opt-out candidates and independent spenders, opponents of triggers de-
sire to monopolize the speech market.
Examine a trigger's effect on the market of political speech. In a jurisdiction that
provides $100,000 of public financing to candidates who agree to spend no more than
this amount, one candidate accepts the $100,000 spending limit and her only opponent
rejects the limit and spends $200,000. If this jurisdiction does not have a trigger the
opt-out candidate will engage in twice as much paid speech as the opt-in candidate.
With a trigger, the opt-in candidate will spend the same amount on speech as the opt-
out candidate.
Most importantly, from the First Amendment point of view, the total amount of
public discourse will be increased as a result of the trigger's subsidy. The opt-out
candidate claims he is harmed because his speech would comprise only fifty percent of
overall candidate spending as compared to the sixty-seven percent it would comprise
without the trigger. However, the trigger would not cause an actual diminishment in
the quantity of the opt-out candidate's speech-it would merely diminish his relative
share of the total amount of speech. Thus, for example, while the amount of flyers the
opt-out candidate may purchase would not be reduced, there would be a reduction in
the percentage of flyers in the campaign paid for by the opt-out candidate.
The conflict between the goal of opponents of triggers and the purpose of the
First Amendment becomes even more apparent outside the campaign context. Imagine
a segregationist organization that announces it will spend $50,000 trying to convince
parents not to participate in a school district's voluntary busing program. In response,
the superintendent of schools announces that for every dollar spent discouraging par-
ents from busing their children, the district will spend a dollar on a public relations
campaign encouraging parents to participate. According to the Eighth Circuit decision
in Day-and opponents of triggers-this organization would have a cognizable First
Amendment claim because it is chilled by the "knowledge" that its speech will trigger
the school district's spending.
This claim simply makes no sense. The First Amendment's purpose is to create
an "uninhibited, robust, and wide open"'7 ° speech market so as to build a "healthy
representative democracy."7 ' A healthy democracy requires informed citizens. The
parents in the above example would be less, not more, informed if they hear only the
opinion of the segregationist organization. Likewise, voters are more informed when an
opt-in candidate has the resources to respond to expenditures by opt-out candidates and
68. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
70. Id.
71. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93 n.127.
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independent spenders.
The government's role in the broadcasting industry presents a useful analog. In a
television market where "The NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw" and PBS's "The
News Hour with Jim Lehrer" are shown at the same time, NBC could prove it loses
some viewers to the government-funded PBS program. Yet any loss of market share
NBC suffers is not thought of as a chilling of the network's First Amendment rights.
Because democracy requires a diverse discourse, First Amendment jurisprudence em-
braces the government's financing of a competing speaker. According to the Buckley
Court,
Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the rule, not the exception.
Our statute books are replete with laws providing financial assistance to the exer-
cise of free speech, such as aid to public broadcasting and other forms of educa-
tional media, and preferential postal rates and antitrust exemptions for newspa-
pers.
72
Each of the decisions upholding triggers recognized that triggers advance, not
chill, First Amendment rights because opt-in candidates are afforded the opportunity to
respond to opt-out candidates and independent spenders. 7' The Day district court stat-
ed it most clearly: "To the extent the statute provides for increased debate about issues
of public concern raised by independent expenditures, it promotes the free and open
debate the First Amendment seeks to foster and protect.,
74
B. Constitutionally, Campaign Finance Systems with Triggers Deserve
Identical Treatment as the Public Finance Provisions Upheld in Buckley
The public finance system for general election presidential candidates upheld by
Buckley gave candidates $20 million if they agreed not to spend additional funds."
Congress did not arrive at this number randomly. It set this number by identifying the
approximate market cost of running for office and attaching an adjustment mechanism
to insure that inflation did not erode this amount's real value. To identify the market
cost, Congress relied upon several factors, including, of course, the average spending
of presidential candidates in prior elections. Looking to the prior behavior of candi-
dates ensured that the amount the government was offering to candidates was sufficient
to generate widespread candidate participation, but not so generous as to be wasteful of
taxpayer funds.
The Buckley Court understood exactly Congress' intent.76 If Congress desired to
subsidize completely the campaigns of major party general election nominees, the
Court reasoned, it had every right to do so. "Whether the chosen means appear bad,
unwise, or unworkable to us is irrelevant." 7 This ruling put the Court's imprimatur
on the following principle: governments may provide candidates with all of the re-
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. The Wilkinson court concluded, "The trigger provision promotes more speech not less."
Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp. at 928. The court in Rosenstiel concurred, stating, "[Tihe State's scheme pro-
motes, rather than detracts from, cherished First Amendment values." Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1552.
74. Day, 863 F. Supp. at 947.
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 88.
76. Id. (identifying FECA's inflationary index); see generally S. REP. No. 93-689, at 4-6 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5590-92 (discussing public financing of all federal elections).
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
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sources necessary to run competitive campaigns.
Campaign finance systems that include triggers operate according to this same
principle-they attempt to offer candidates an amount of campaign funds that will
allow candidates to run competitive campaigns. The difference between a trigger and
the presidential financing system upheld in Buckley lies simply in how the public sub-
sidy amount is derived. The system upheld in Buckley was set by looking at expen-
ditures made in prior elections. Campaign systems that include triggers are set by
looking at expenditures made during an election.
Thus, triggers are merely a modernization device for campaign finance systems.
Because of the vast increases in independent spending and spending by self-financed
candidates, to set voluntary spending levels, governments must look at more than ex-
penditures in prior elections. Otherwise, in an era where a national organization can
use a mail-house to send glossy campaign literature to every voter in a given district in
a matter of days, candidates would face too volatile of a campaign spending market.
Providing candidates with adequate funds requires that campaign finance systems have
a more time-sensitive market-correction device. In sum, triggers ensure that voluntary
spending limits give candidates the same benefit they were given in the Buckley era-a
level of funding that enables candidaies to run competitive campaigns. Because they
serve the same purpose as the public funding system upheld by the Buckley Court,
triggers deserve identical constitutional treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new generation of clashes between campaign finance systems and the First
Amendment is coming to the federal courts. Responding to the explosion of indepen-
dent spending and spending by self-financed candidates, reformers are seeking passage
of campaign finance systems that will more effectively level the financial playing field
among candidates. Triggers serve this purpose by giving financial benefits to candi-
dates who agree to limit their spending but face independent spenders or candidates
who do not agree to such limits. To overcome the hostile components of the three
cases that have reviewed triggers, reformers must argue persuasively that (1) permit-
ting and encouraging a response to speech is not "chilling" and (2) constitutionally,
campaign finance systems that include triggers deserve identical treatment as the public
funding system upheld in Buckley.
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